All posts in Data Analysis

Comparing the Starts: Bradley versus Klinsmann

Chart1
Share

We are 13 matches into the relationship between Jürgen Klinsmann and the United States National Team. A relationship that many believed was going to begin a long time ago.

Back in 2006, Klinsmann was the frontrunner to be named head coach of the U.S. squad, but negotiations broke down, and Bob Bradley was named manager of the club in December 2006, after the U.S. struggled in the 2006 World Cup.

Bradley reeled off an impressive run for the U.S. before being relieved of his duties in July 2011. He led the USMNT to a 43-25-12 record, which is the second best of any U.S. Men’s National Team manager. His accomplishments included a second place finish at the 2009 Confederations Cup and the U.S. team sitting atop its first-round group at the 2010 World Cup.

But Bradley was often criticized for his bland offensive strategy and loyalty to certain players. In an ESPN article David Hirshey described Bradley’s coaching style as having an “almost pathological inability to allow flair and joy into the American game. His myopic, turgid vision led Bradley back to the core American attributes — speed, physicality, athleticism — a set of principles that left little room for players looking to express themselves with the ball at their feet.”

Enter Klinsmann, who the U.S. hired right after releasing Bradley.

Before taking the U.S. job, Klinsmann led the German National squad in 2004 where he racked up a record of 20-8-6. He coached Bayern Munich next, but fell out with management a year later and has worked, most recently as a consultant with MLS’s Toronto FC.

Hirshey wrote, in the previous mentioned article that with Klinsmann, “the U.S. finally has a coach with no ties to a college system that has produced an assembly line of brawny, hard-working, but not exceptionally skilled players.”

So how has Klinsmann faired thus far? And how does it compare with Bradley’s start?

Comparison Through First 13 Matches: Klinsmann vs. Bradley

Through his first 13 games, Klinsmann has compiled a 6-5-2 record, winning only one of his first 6 matches at the helm. But Klinsmann and the U.S. have turned it on as of late, winning their first four matches of 2012 including a 5-1 drubbing of Scotland, and just the second time the squad has opened the year with four straight wins. The

U.S. followed up the Scotland match with a humbling loss to Brazil and a disappointing tie with Canada.

For Bradley, he opened his career as manager with a 10-2-1 record, not suffering his first loss until his 12th match.

Obviously, its not just about the start these coaches have had will define their legacy’s, but Bradley clearly enjoyed much more early success than Klinsmann has out the gate. The U.S. squad scored nearly twice as many goals under Bradley through 13 games than it has under Klinsmann, while taking roughly the same amount of shots. Is the U.S. building to that more dynamic offense we hoped to see under Klinsmann? If we look at the Scotland match, then yes. If we look at Brazil and Canada, then its still a work in progress.

USMNT Shots By Match: Klinsmann vs. Bradley

The one area where the U.S. has seen an advantage under Klinsmann has been in corner kicks, attempting 23 more.

Following the Scotland win, the head manager shared his vision for Team USA:

Step by step, what we are trying to develop is a fast-paced game. There’s tempo in it. There’s one-touch combinations throughout midfield, as fast as possible, finding forwards up there, having pace, buildup from the back, no long balls. I think we saw some of

those elements today. Obviously it’s a bit more difficult to play that way against Brazil or Italy, but I think the players, they understand more and more what we’re trying to achieve.

The U.S. has already taken significant steps from where they were last year under Klinsmann. Friday’s match against Antigua & Barbuda will be their next chance to prove they are coming together.

Below is a match-by-match breakdown of the first 13 contests by both Klinsmann and Bradley as USMNT head coach:

Klinsmann First 13 Games: (Record: 6-5-2)

Date Score/Result Opponent Shots Corners Offside Penalties
10-Aug-11 1-1 (T) Mexico 6 2 0
2-Sep-11 0-1 (L) Costa Rica 11 4 5
6-Sep-11 0-1 (L) Belgium 6 3 1
8-Oct-11 1-0 (W) Honduras 11 5 0
11-Oct-11 0-1 (L) Ecuador 22 10 0
11-Nov-11 0-1 (L) France 5 3 1
15-Nov-11 3-2 (W) Slovenia 11 5 3
21-Jan-12 1-0 (W) Venezuela 15 7 0
25-Jan-11 1-0 (W) Panama 8 0 0
29-Feb-12 1-0 (W) Italy 4 2 0
26-May-12 5-1 (W) Scotland 14 3 0
30-May-12 1-4 (L) Brazil 15 8 2
3-Jun-12 0-0 (T) Canada 9 8 1
Total Goals Total Shots Total Corners Total Penalties
14 137 60 13
1.08 per game 10.54 per game 4.62 per game 1.00 per game

 

Bradley’s First 13 Games: (Record: 10-2-1)

Date Score Opponent Shots Corners Offside Penalties
20-Jan-07 3-1 (W) Denmark 13 2 1
7-Feb-07 2-0 (W) Mexico 5 2 2
25-Mar-07 3-1 (W) Ecuador 10 4 1
28-Mar-07 0-0 (T) Guatemala 7 3 0
2-Jun-07 4-1 (W) China PR 10 4 8
7-Jun-07 1-0 (W) Guatemala 17 4 1
9-Jun-07 2-0 (W) Trinidad & Tobago 16 0 8
12-Jun-07 4-0 (W) El Salvador 10 3 3
16-Jun-07 2-1 (W) Panama 4 5 2
21-Jun-07 2-1 (W) Canada 13 3 3
24-Jun-07 2-1 (W) Mexico 15 2 0
28-Jun-07 1-4 (L) Argentina 6 0 1
2-Jul-07 1-3 (L) Paraguay 14 5 0
Total Goals Total Shots Total Corners Total Penalties
27 140 37 30
2.08 per game 10.77 per game 2.85 per game 2.31 per game

 

Share

German efficiency and…flair?

Share

Flair, style, youth and enthusiasm. Those are the prominent traits of the team many commentators believe to be the favorite to go all the way at Euro 2012. Four years ago they would have been talking about Spain. Now it’s Germany.

This style has surprised many fans as decidedly un-German. As a team known for discipline and getting results, the German faithful have been delighted to watch their young side produce some of the most entertaining soccer in the nation’s history.

Die Mannschaft, as the German team is affectionately known, achieved perfection in its qualifying campaign, taking all 30 points from 10 games played. That’s a higher point total than any other group winner and almost twice as many points as Group A runner up Turkey.

On top of that, the team tallied a final goal difference of 27, second only to the Netherlands’ 29.

International friendlies have also been highly successful leading up to this summer’s tournament. Over the last two years they’ve bested England, Argentina, Uruguay (twice), Brazil and, this year, Holland. This young German team has harnessed the ambition of coach Joachim Low and delivered scintillating performances.

One look at the German squad and it’s clear how much talent is available. Mesut Özil has had a banner year at Real Madrid, starting 44 games in all competitions and producing 7 goals and 20 assists. Likewise, Mario Gomez started 45 games for Bayern Munich, scoring a whopping 40 goals and providing 4 assists.

With all the new attacking flair, though, Germany still haven’t forgotten their roots in defensive discipline. Philipp Lahm and Jerome Boateng anchored the Bayern defense on its way to the Champions League Final this season, starting 91 games between them.

Still, there are indications that this new-style Germany is no longer as much of a

surprise as it was during qualifying. Both Poland and Ukraine held the heavily favored Germans to draws toward the end of 2011, while vulnerabilities were exposed in a 2-1 loss to France in February and a 5-3 shocker at the hands of Switzerland in May.

Expect the Germans to be highly motivated to perform this summer, though. Having fallen to Spain four years ago in the 2008 final and again in the semifinals of the 2010 World Cup, they’ll be out to prove they’re more than a

team that falls at the last hurdle.

If they can successfully blend the flair and style of a Spanish team with their traditional tournament efficiency and stubborn will to win, Germany may well be the team to beat in this tournament.

Share

Much Ado about Robin

Share

For the Dutch, Euro 2012 is all about exorcising the demons of 2010.

The Netherlands sides of the 70’s invented Total Football, a fluid, attacking style of soccer now epitomized by Barcelona and Spain. When the originators met the innovators in Soccer City, the Netherlands stooped to a defensive game plan designed to disrupt Spain’s flowing offense.

Nigel de Jong’s blatant kung fu kick on Xabi Alonso was a low point, but the entire match was an ugly scar on Dutch soccer history. It wasn’t just that they lost, but the manner in which they did.

“In the space of two hours in that final, they destroyed a 40-year tradition, dragged it through the s***,” said Hard Gras magazine editor Henk Spaan. “It was a disgrace; a lack of any historical insight, leadership and morals.”

Needless to say there’s more than wins and losses as stake this summer for The Oranje.

So how do you win back a nation in love with beautiful, attacking soccer? The short answer is score goals, and the key to that in an offense filled to bursting with dangerous weapons is the form of Robin van Persie.

The numbers the Flying Dutchman put up for Arsenal this season are no secret. 30 goals this season, the most in the English Premier League. 50 goals in 2011. The Arsenal captain has absolutely lived up to the fan assertion that ‘he scores when he wants.”

The first part of 7amkickoff’s end-of-season ‘By the Numbers’ piece further highlights the Gunners’ reliance on RVP this season. Van Persie attempted 174 shots this season, representing 27% of Arsenal’s 637 shots attempted all season. Arsenal scored 74 goals, producing one every 8.6 attempts. Van Persie’s average, on the other hand, was a goal every 5.8 attempts.

Adding assists to his total, RVP produced 53% of Arsenal’s goals all season. Those numbers alone tell the story of a club reliant on one player to be the sharp end of the stick. It’s even clearer when you look at the sharp drop-off after him.

Theo Walcott, Arsenal’s second highest scorer this season, produced only 8 goals in 76 shots—9.5 shots per goal. Aaron Ramsey attempted the third most shots, 62, with only 2 ending up in the back of the net—31 shots per goal. The rest of the list is all over the place: 14 shots per goal for Alex Song, 38 for Tomas Rosicky, 10 for Gervinho.

All of this is to answer one question: can the Netherlands possibly replicate van Persie’s club form at the international level?

Generally, the answer has been no. In 8 games for The Oranje in 2011 and 2012 van Persie attempted only 8 shots, 5 of those on goal and 2 that scored. By shots it’s not a terrible average, but scoring only twice in 8 games for Arsenal over the same period would have been considered a drought.

What’s the difference? As the numbers for Arsenal show, reliance. Van Persie played centrally for Arsenal this season and was always the focal point of the attack. Part of the reason so many of the Gunners’ other attacking

players display such poor numbers is that they were constantly looking to find the man with the scoring touch.

RVP won’t be blessed with such generous service this summer, and it’s likely he won’t play in that central position. Manager Bert van Marwijk is spoiled for choice up top, and half the challenge will be finding a formation that fits all, or most, of that talent on the field at one time. Rather than being the central pillar

of the attack, van Persie will share that responsibility with the likes of Arjen Robben, Klaas-Jan Huntelaar, Dirk Kuyt and Wesley Sneijder.

Of course, that’s just the offense and there will be many questions asked of the Netherlands’ porous defense. But if they can find a way to transfer some of RVP’s goal-scoring form in red and white to his orange shirt, he could well drag them to the final the same way he dragged Arsenal to Champions League qualification.

Share

Less is More: If Chelsea go to penalties again

Share

Chelsea will venture into hostile territory Saturday as they face Bayern Munich in their home Allianz Arena for the elusive Champions League spoils. The Blues have been this close before, much closer in fact, when they took on Manchester United in the 2008 final, a campaign that ended in a disastrous penalty kick exchange.

Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski outline the mind games that took place that night brilliantly in Chapter 6 of their book Soccernomics, a chapter appropriately titled “The Economist’s Fear of the Penalty generic cialis no prescription Kick.”

Chelsea had been perfectly prepared for the shootout. With the help of outside research they knew individual player behavior (like the fact that if Cristiano Ronaldo paused in his run-up to the ball he tended to shoot to the keeper’s right), as well as their own tendencies (right-footed players usually took their shots to the keeper’s right while left-footed ones would go to the left).

You can actually see everything as it plays out. If you haven’t seen the spot kicks, go ahead and take a few minutes to watch them now. It’s okay, I’ll still be here.

Everything went to plan for Chelsea. Cech saw Ronaldo stutter and guessed right, and every one of Chelsea’s right-footed players went to the keeper’s left instead of their usual right. But, critically, Ashley Cole, the one left-footed player to take a shot for The Blues, opted to go to the left as well.

That one decision clued United’s Edwin van der Sar in, albeit for faulty reasons: all the Chelsea players were going to his left. As Nicolas Anelka, another right-footed player, prepared to take his shot, van der Sar pointed to his left as though to say “I know where your shot’s going.” Anelka second-guessed himself, went to keeper’s right, and the rest is history.

Mind games (and John Terry’s slippery footing) aside, what can Chelsea do this time around to avoid a similar ending should their second chance go to penalties as well? An Israeli study conducted in 2009 may have the answers.

The study, headed by Michael Bar-Eli at the Ben-Gurion University of Negev, analyzed 286 videos of penalty kicks from Europe, South America, the European Championships and the World Cup. They divided the goal into thirds vertically (high,

middle and low) and horizontally (right, center and left).

From the kicker’s perspective, 85% of all shots on target were successful. More than half of the shots taken were placed in the lower third of the goal, with those attempts scoring about 80% of the time. Just 13% of shots were placed on the upper third of the goal, but every one that was on target was successful.

More importantly, 83% of shots to either side of the keeper were successful, while 87% of shots taken straight down the middle were. Keepers can use this to their advantage.

Keepers have an overpowering urge to move: they dive to one side or the other in a whopping 94% of penalty kick situations. When they do, they guess right 40% of the time, and even then stop only 25-30% of shots.

However, when they stay in the center of the goal and the kicker takes their shot down the middle, keepers have a 60% save rate. With around 30% of penalty kicks placed in the center, a keeper increases their chances of stopping a shot from 13% to 33% just by staying put.

Simple geometry further supports this trend. A goalkeeper at full stretch to one side of the goal or the other is only able to cover about 1/9 of the goal (one of the lower outside thirds) whereas staying in the center of the goal allows the keeper to confidently cover closer to a third of the goal (the top, middle and lower central sections).

So why do goalkeepers continue to move to one side or another when their chances seem so much better in the center of goal? For one, experienced players will often rely on their ability to read the kicker’s run-up to predict where the shot will go.

But Azar also points to a “bias towards action” that compels players to do something rather than nothing. A survey of goalkeepers found that they often feel worse if a goal is scored when they remain central as opposed to diving left or right.

So if Petr Cech finds himself staring at the business end of an Arjen Robben penalty kick this Saturday, and wants to avoid an unfortunate repeat of four years ago, he’d best just stay put.

That is, if he can fight his itchy feet.

Share

Does having more possession increase a team's chances of winning?

Share
The above question has been posed before, and while previous studies have nullified the significance of having an advantage in possession, we wished to conduct our own study. For this study, we examined all regular season games of the current M

LS season through September 1, a total of 235 games.

It seems very logical that the team that holds the possession advantage has a greater chance of scoring more goals, and thus winning the game. The fact that a team cannot score without having possession of the ball lends itself to this conclusion. However, the numbers suggest something else.

After gathering data for all 235 regular season games (of which 68 were draws), we noticed that more games have actually been won viagra canadian pharmacy by the team that had less possession. This is true across all margins of victory (victories of 1-4 goals).

We have seen more high-profile examples of this outside of MLS. One popular example is Inter Milan’s championship run in the

2009-2010 UEFA Champions League. They defeated the champions of the English, Spanish and German leagues en route to their trophy. In the final against Bayern Munich, Inter Milan had the ball for only 30 percent of the game, yet still won 2-0. Inter had even less of the ball in their two-leg semifinal against Barcelona (they held the ball for just 21.5 percent of the two matches), yet still managed to win 3-2 on aggregate. While Inter’s Champions League run may be a bit on the extreme side, our study — along with others before it — shows it’s much closer to the norm than one might think.One possible explanation for the above data is that teams that emphasize the counter attack are more successful than their attacking counterparts. However, one cannot assume this to be true for all teams. Teams that simply rely on counter-attacking and not creating their own offensive opportunities cannot be expected to consistently succeed. Every team needs an offense for when they are behind, as well as a defense to hold their lead.

A more likely explanation is that certain teams have more efficient networks than others, which allow them to score more often while having the ball. At Chimu, we aim to map each team’s network, and see exactly how these teams are able to score, and whether their success can be consistently replicated given the right players and the right circumstances.

So rather than having the ball for a majority of the time, it might be more important to have the right pieces in place at the right time. The team’s chances of success would then fall on their ability to reproduce these situations in which they have proven to score most often. And from a defensive standpoint, it becomes easier to defend against a team once you know how, and from where, they are most likely to score.

What do you think explains the lack of correlation between an advantage in possession and winning? Would you like to see a network analysis that would show how teams could be more efficient with the ball? Feel free to comment below.

Share

Garbage in garbage out, the rocky road of big data analysis

Share

The era of big data analysis in soccer is fast approaching. With this en

tails new and old challenges. Perhaps one of the hardest challenges for insiders and outsiders alike is the fact that it is big data. Computer scientists and modellers simulators have an oft-repeated expression “garbage in, garbage out” (GIGO). With big data comes an even larger challenge of testing, verifying and validating the raw data. If the raw data is crap, the resulting analysis will also be crap.Unfortunately, testing, verifying and validating large amounts of raw data is more of an art than a science. Proficiency and expertise come with experience. While lots of well-intentioned fellows (some even with degrees) may think they know what they are doing, they can still make serious mistakes that severely undermine their conclusions (see, for example, Mistaken Identifiers: Gene name errors can be introduced inadvertently when using Excel in bioinformatics).

At Chimu Solutions, we have decades of combined experience dealing with datasets that can amount to terabytes of data. Our guiding principle is that before we calculate anything, we must first understand and characterize the potential problems with the raw data. Only by following this approach can we confidently say that we do not “GIGO” you, the consumer, with our analyses.

Professor Luis Amaral has analyzed and guided the analysis of extremely large datasets ranging from finance to biology, and has the published papers to prove it. He also has the citations to

demonstrate that he did not GIGO anyone.

Share